Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been accorded a central role in the post-communist economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe.This paper examines the regional effects of FDI in Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) in the 1990s. It challenges uncritical views of FDI and its role in regional economic transformations by considering its potentially adverse effects for regional economic development, such as the intensification of uneven development, the development of a dual economy, failure to develop linkages with local and regional economies, and its contribution to increased regional economic instability. A casestudy of the Czech automotive components industry illustrates the regional economic effects of FDI in Central Europe in terms of stability of investment, its links with the regional economy and its effects on domestic research and development.
KEY WORDS ★ automobile industry ★ Central Europe ★ Czech Republic ★ foreign direct investment ★ regional development ★ research and development among the CEE politicians, especially after failures of domestic mass privatization schemes in countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia to generate large-scale, radical restructuring of formerly stateowned industrial enterprises. In this context, FDI is generally considered to be vastly superior to domestic capital in generating such strategic restructuring, leading to a long-term successful survival of domestic companies and by doing so becoming the 'driving force in economic development' in CEE countries (Jelonkiewicz, 2001) . Attracting greenfield investments to regions with high unemployment levels is viewed by both regional and national politicians as a desirable solution to their economic problems. These views of FDI contributed to 'Eastern Europe's obsession with foreign investors' (The Economist, 1991: 25) and an intense competition among the CEE countries over FDI inflows in the1990s that continued in the early 2000s.
Although this paper does not underestimate potentially positive effects of FDI on affected companies (see Pavlínek, 2002a) , industrial sectors (see Pavlínek, 2002b; 2002c; 2003) and on overall economic development, it argues that uncritical, unbalanced and undiscriminating views of FDI are incorrect. In reality, FDI in CEE has not necessarily led to an automatic success in all FIEs (see Pavlínek, 2000; 2002a) , its effects have been very uneven both sectorally and geographically (see Pavlínek and Smith, 1998; UNCTAD, 2001; Pavlínek, 2002b) and the generally assumed superior performance of FIEs compared to domestic enterprises has been very difficult to verify empirically with the exception of manufacturing (Szanyi, 2000) . Uncritical views of the FDI role in the CEE economic transformations generally fail to recognize that there are many different types of FDI and a large diversity of FIEs in all possible respects with various effects on individual companies, regions and national economies (Szanyi, 2000) . 2 Such views also tend to stress the positive effects on national income, jobs and government revenues typically associated with FDI in host countries, while largely ignoring the adverse effects related to FDI, such as those on balance of payments and loss of sovereignty. It is also being generally overlooked that impacts of FDI on host developed countries have been regarded as European Urban and Regional Studies 2004 11(1) 48 EUROPEAN URBAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES 11(1) • deskilling • spillovers to local and regional economy
• regional specialization in low-skilled, labour-intensive • increased opportunities for local companies to supply production foreign-owned companies
• development of 'dual economy'
• branch plant syndrome • instability of Western investment more favourable compared to FDI effects in less developed countries (see Hood and Young, 1993) . The high expectations associated with FDI based upon the past experience of highly developed Western economies or rapidly growing East Asian economies thus tend to overlook the experience of less developed countries with FDI that may be relevant in the case of CEE. The goal of this paper is to discuss regional development effects of FDI in Central Europe (CE -Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). It deliberately focuses on 'problematic' issues related to FDI. The first part of the paper concentrates on three interrelated issues: the relationship between FDI, economic growth and uneven regional development; long-term economic effects of FDI in the host countries; and the integration of FIEs in local and regional economies. The second part draws on the case-study of the Czech automotive components industry to illustrate potential risks for local and regional economic development associated with FDI in CE. In particular, it briefly investigates the questions of stability of Western investment, regional economic linkages of FIEs, and FDI effects on enterprise research and development (R&D).
FDI, economic growth and uneven development
In the early 1990s, Western economists argued that CEE needed large amounts of FDI to achieve rapid economic growth and Western levels of labour productivity. 3 Although annual FDI inflows to CEE increased dramatically in the 1990s, they remained low in the global context, well below its 5.4 percent share of the world's population (Tables 2 and 3) . CEE attracted $166.5b between 1990 and 2001 or 2.7 percent of the total compared to $4,404b (71.4 percent) invested in the industrialized countries and $1,598b (25.9 percent) invested in the less developed countries. FDI inflows to CEE were also low in the European context. While CEE accounts for 46 percent of Europe's population, it attracted only 5.7 percent of total FDI inflows to Europe between 1990 and 2001. For example, the entire CEE (population of 334m) attracted lower cumulative FDI inflows than Spain, (population of 41m, FDI Source: UNCTAD (1996; .
inflows of $169.5b) during this period (UNCTAD, 1996; PRB, 2002) . Within CEE, FDI inflows were very uneven. Central Europe (CE) accounted for 64.3 percent of all FDI inflows between 1990 (UNCTAD 1996 . The highest FDI stock as of 2001 was in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Russia (Table 4) . Highest FDI stock per capita was in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia (Table 5 ). The argument that FDI generates economic growth and development is widely accepted but it has never been proven (Nicholls et al., 1998) . Hood and Young (1993: 101) argued, for example, that 'overall, no clear generalisations are possible either in regard to the impact of MNEs [multinational enterprises] on national income in developing host countries or in respect of the effects on other development goals'. Others have argued that economic growth tends to attract FDI rather than the opposite way (Gowan, 1995) , which is supported by the fact that about three-quarters of global annual FDI inflows are invested in the developed countries (Table 3) . Causality tests performed by Fabry (2001) to find relationships between FDI, economic growth and trade in CEE in the 1990s yielded inconclusive results. The relationship between FDI inflows and economic growth is thus less than clear.
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EUROPEAN URBAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES 11(1) 1996; 2001; 2002) . At the regional level, FDI should ideally contribute to overall economic growth and regional economic restructuring by increasing competition and by transferring and diffusing new forms of production organization. These changes then should lead to productivity improvements across the regional economy (Florida, 1996) . FDI is typically attracted to the existing economic clusters to benefit from external economies of scale such as markets, existing pools of qualified labour, factors of production, suppliers, infrastructure, institutions and innovative capabilities (UNCTAD, 2001) . It explains why FDI contributed to uneven development and regional polarization in CE as more developed and more industrialized regions attracted higher volumes of FDI than less developed and less industrialized regions in the 1990s (e.g. Tomeš and Hampl, 1999; Domański 2001a; J. P. Kiss, 2001) . FDI in the forms of banking, financial and service types of investments concentrated in the capital cities increasing their primacy. Other big cities were also the target of FDI into the service-related activities but expensive urban areas tended to be less favoured by manufacturing investment. In the Czech Republic, for example, Prague and Brno, the two largest cities, attracted over 60 percent of service-oriented foreign-owned firms but only 24 percent of manufacturing FDI (Blažek, 1999) . However, even greenfield manufacturing investments are disproportionately attracted by metropolitan areas.
In Poland, less than one-fifth of greenfield FDI in industry and mining was located in nonmetropolitan areas as of 1998. Overall, FDI contributed to the reproduction of existing regional disparities both between western and eastern Poland and between metropolitan and peripheral areas. About one-third of industrial FDI was invested in the southern industrialized regions along the border with the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Lower Silesia, Silesia and Małopolska provinces account for 30 percent of total industrial FDI) and 42 percent in central Poland (Mazowiecka, Wielkopolska, Łódzka and Kujawsko-Pomorska provinces), while less industrialized eastern Poland and the western border areas attracted low volumes of FDI (Domański, 2001a; .
In the Czech Republic, in addition to Prague and other large cities, FDI tended to concentrate in the more industrialized central and north-western Bohemia. The regions close to the German and Austrian border benefited from cross-border FDI (Pavlínek, 1998 (CNB, 2003: 34-5) . 4 In Slovakia, the share of the Bratislava region is even higher as it was the host of over 60 percent of FDI throughout the 1990s and it accounted for 67.8 percent of the total Slovak FDI stock as of 30 September 2002. The seven remaining Slovak regions received low amounts of FDI (each between 2.2 percent and 4.0 percent of the Slovak total). The only exception is the south-eastern Košický region (12.7 percent of FDI stock as of 2002) dominated by the second largest Slovak city of Košice. 5 Bratislava region's share is 58.1 percent when FDI in the banking sector is excluded (NBS, 2003: 44) .
In Hungary, in addition to Budapest (56.5 percent of FDI stock and 53.5 percent of FIEs in 2000) and the historically industrialized North West, the previously little industrialized western areas along the Austrian border have attracted crossborder FDI by their relative location with respect to Western Europe (Fazekas, 2000; OECD, 2000; HCSO, 2002 (Fazekas, 2000) . The situation slowly started to change in the late 1990s with more FDI being located in south-western and eastern Hungary because of labour shortages and growing production costs in the North West. However, the diffusion of FDI outside Budapest and the North West will most likely be very limited because the less developed eastern regions have a poorly educated population (Hamar, 1999; J.P. Kiss, 2001; Serenyi, 2001a) . 8
Long-term economic effects of FDI in the host countries
Although the immediate positive effects of FDI may be considerable at the company level and for local economies, the long-term economic effects of FDI in the host countries are less clear. After the entry of FDI, local economies may benefit from continued and often expanded production that saves jobs in FIEs (especially where the privatization agreement obliged foreign investors to maintain current employment for a particular period), or new jobs are created in greenfield investments (e.g. Hardy, 1998) . At the same time, foreign takeovers are often associated with labour shedding, disinvestment and downsizing of production (Hardy, 1998; Smith and Ferenčíková, 1998 (Foley et al., 1996; Dicken, 1998; Hardy, 1998) . At the national scale, the growth in real income resulting from imports of capital, technology and skills is one of the most important potential positive direct economic effects of FDI (Mišun and Tomšík, 2002: 57) . Domestic suppliers of FIEs that survive the rigorous selection process may become more competitive internationally (e.g. Pavlínek, 2003) . However, direct economic benefits such as in capital formation, employment, trade and the balance of payment may only be short term (Young et al., 1994 ). FDI's effects in terms of increased competition and restructuring throughout the economies of CE countries have so far been limited because of its concentration and sectoral specialization. 9 Vertical integration of CE branch plants into the networks of transnational corporations (TNCs) results in external control and makes the local plants more dependent on the destiny of the individual corporations and more vulnerable to international economic fluctuations. It also limits their integration and linkages with the local economy, thus affecting their potential multiplier effects. The absence of local linkages has typified many FDIs to the former East Germany and Hungary, the two former state socialist economies that have witnessed the deepest FDI penetration so far (see Grabher, 1994) . 10 In the case of Hungary, some observers suggested that the country could become 'Europe's Mexico', that it could suffer from the 'Maquiladora syndrome' because of its increasing dependence on FDI seeking low-cost labour and governmental incentives for foreign investors. The primary function of such investments, the argument goes, is to assemble imported Western components into finished goods that are then re-exported to the West. Their economic benefits are limited to the creation of low-skilled jobs and increased exports (Ellingstad, 1997; Kapoor and Eddy, 1998) . Although such a view obviously exaggerates the existing situation by ignoring the diversity and complexity of FIEs in Hungary, it points to potential dangers related to the increased dependence of CE countries on a strategy of using low labour costs to attract FDI; this strategy may prevent CE from securing a better position in the world economy by reinforcing its role as a low-cost production base vulnerable to low-cost competition from less developed countries.
In the case of Poland, and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic, cheap labour was not the primary reason for FDI in the early 1990s. Market capture investments often combined with an export-oriented motivation were more important by far both in terms of overall value of investment and in terms of economic impact (Benáček and Zemplinerová, 1997; Hardy, 1998; Pavlínek, 1998; Domański, 1999) . By the late 1990s, however, after the initial capture of domestic monopoly producers, cost-cutting was increasingly becoming the leading reason for FDI in CE, especially in Hungary and the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic, for example, has increasingly become the target for mass-production relocation from Western Europe to capitalize on its low wages. For example, Matsushita moved its production of television sets including 1,400 jobs from Cardiff to Plzeń in 2000 (Plesl, 2000) . In 2001, Compaq moved 700 low-skill assembly jobs from Erskine (Scotland) and Celestica transferred 570 assembly jobs from its circuit board factory in Ashton-underLyne near Manchester to the Czech Republic (Jones, 2001; Nicholson, 2001) . In 2002, Black & Decker, the American power tools manufacturer, announced the transfer of assembly and packaging operations including about 600 jobs from Spennymoor (United Kingdom) to a new plant in the Czech Republic (at Trmice) for cost-cutting reasons (Tran, 2002) . This type of transfer and outsourcing of parts of the production process by Western TNCs to relatively low-cost low-wage areas of CE has limited regional economic benefits in CE as it leads to very low levels of local value appropriation (Smith et al., 2002: 51-2) . Mišun and Tomšík (2002) measured the effects of FDI on capital formation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. They argue that FDI which brings new goods and services into a domestic economy usually has more favourable effects on capital formation than FDI in the existing sectors where competing domestic companies may cause the effect of 'emptying investment opportunities for domestic investors in favor of foreign investors' (the so called 'crowding-out' of domestic investment) (p. 59). FDI which crowdsout domestic investment or does not contribute to capital formation has negative effects for host countries. Based on their theoretical model and empirical testing, Mišun and Tomšík (2002) found evidence of a crowding-out effect in Poland in the period 1990-2000 which they explain by the primarily market-capture nature of FDI in Poland during this period and its negative effects on the existing domestic companies in the sectors targeted by FDI. Contrary to Poland, 1990 FDI in Hungary and 1993 FDI in the Czech Republic had positive effects on increasing domestic investment as FDI was primarily export-oriented, especially in the case of Hungary (the so-called 'crowding-in' effect). The crowding-in effect was much stronger in Hungary than in the Czech Republic.
Development of dual economy?
It has been argued that growing FDI inflows lead to the development of 'dual economy' in CE (Hamar, 1999; Mejstřík, 1999; Benáček, 2000; Hunya, 2000b; Kapoor, 2000, Mišun and Tomšík, 2001 ). On the one hand, a small number of FIEs integrated into TNC networks undergo rapid restructuring based on the transfer of modern technology, Western management and production strategies. These companies then drive countries' exports by mass producing goods for Western markets, but they remain few in number and employ a small number of people. Their effect on the rest of the economy is limited and their local economic linkages are truncated or only poorly developed. Such 'cathedrals in the desert' (Morris, 1992; Grabher, 1994; typically offer low-skilled or narrowly qualified jobs used to operate modern massproduction technology.
On the other hand, there are domestically owned firms employing a vast majority of the manufacturing workforce. Many of these firms are still dominated by state socialist legacies in terms of European Urban and Regional Studies 2004 11(1) PAVLÍNEK: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS OF FDI their management, many of them are still owned by the state, or their ownership is often ambiguous (as in the case of hundreds of companies privatized through voucher privatization in the Czech Republic and Slovakia). These firms have typically been slow to restructure as they lacked capital and managerial skills to do so. Many of them acquired large debts through soft loans, which they are unable to pay off, and further credit is unavailable because of the existing credit crunch. Many of these firms have been negatively affected by asset stripping and rent seeking by their own managers (Pavlínek, 2002d) . In addition, these companies usually produce for domestic markets where a large proportion of the local population has a low purchasing power and foreign competition is intense. As a result, local companies have typically had major difficulties adjusting to market conditions and foreign competition, and most of the time they have just been fighting for short-term survival. The emerging dual economy has been reinforced by the fact that foreign investors tend to invest in domestic firms with above-average productivity, profitability and capital. At the same time, FDI was almost nonexistent in the traditional backbones of state socialist industry in the 1990s (such as the steel industry, large machinery industry, chemicals, coal mining, coke and refinery) that continued to employ large numbers of workers, had excess capacities, and were in dire need of extensive restructuring/modernization (Zemplinerová, 1998; Głębocki and Rogacki, 2002) . The end product of these processes has been a widening gap between a few efficient and successful FIEs and a majority of increasingly impoverished local companies.
It has been argued that the phenomenon of dual economy is already well developed in Hungary and increasingly in the Czech Republic. In Hungary, FIEs employed 15 percent of the workforce, produced 40 percent of output, and accounted for 80 percent of exports in 1999 (46.5 percent of manufacturing workforce, 88.8 percent of manufacturing exports, 73 percent of manufacturing sales) (UNCTAD, 2001; Mišun and Tomšík, 2002) . In the Czech Republic, FIEs accounted for nearly half of the exports while employing only 3.2 percent of the total workforce in 1998 (60 percent of manufacturing exports, 19 percent of industrial production and 18 percent of the manufacturing employment), with Volkswagen (VW)-Škoda JV alone being responsible for 10 percent of Czech exports while it was employing only 20,400 workers. In 1996, 92 percent of the total gross profit in Czech manufacturing was produced by FIEs that accounted for only 23 percent of the total manufacturing output (Pomery, 1997; Harris, 1998; Zemplinerová, 1998; UNCTAD, 2001; Mišun and Tomšík, 2002) .
However, this type of classification of enterprises in two large groups is overly simplistic because it overlooks the existing diversity in both domestic companies and FIEs. There are many examples of domestic companies that have successfully restructured without FDI and are highly competitive today. At the same time, not all FDI has led to the kind of enterprise success described above (Pavlínek, 2000; 2002a) . The dual economy argument also underestimates the extent of restructuring in many domestically owned enterprises after their ownership consolidation in the late 1990s that followed the initial (typically unsuccessful) post-privatization period (Pavlínek, 2002d) .
Local integration of foreign-owned companies
Linkages of foreign-owned plants with domestic firms are considered the most important mechanism through which technology transfer takes place, additional jobs are generated, and new local enterprises are formed (Dicken, 1998; UNCTAD, 2001) . The degree of integration of FIEs in local and regional economies of the host countries varies considerably because there are large differences between both industrial sectors and in strategies pursued by TNCs within a particular sector (e.g. Pavlínek and Smith, 1998; Pavlínek, 2002c) . FIEs with a high degree of local integration can play an important role in regional economic transformation by encouraging and triggering restructuring of supplier networks. This has been the case for some FDI in the CE passenger car industry as typified by VW's investment in the Czech carmaker Škoda that led to the transformation of Škoda's network of component suppliers with important implications for the national economy as a whole (e.g. Meyer, 2000; Pavlínek, 2003) . However, not all FDI is likely to result in the development of supplier linkages with local companies. Export-oriented, cross-border investments are particularly likely to be isolated from local economies. 11 Many Western companies develop no or only few linkages with local firms because they often find it difficult to secure supplies of components from domestic suppliers at the desired level of sophistication, quality, and timing of deliveries (Grabher, 1994; Ellingstad, 1997; Pavlínek, 1998; Pavlínek and Smith, 1998; Swain, 1998) . At the same time, direct local competitors of FIEs are often forced out of business as they cannot compete; such FIEs have more efficient production, an advantage reinforced by tax holidays and other financial incentives provided by governments to attract them, and they also benefit from transfer pricing that is unavailable to domestic companies. Similar effects of FDI have been reported from peripheral regions in Western Europe, leading to an argument that the truncated nature of FDI activities in such regions can actually act to their long-term disadvantage because it restricts their potential development of supplier linkages within the domestic economy (Ashcroft and Love, 1993; Dicken, 1998) .
Even in the cases of some car manufacturers (such as VW-Škoda in the Czech Republic and Suzuki in Hungary) where the degree of local integration is high, many of their foreign-owned suppliers are typical branch plants vertically integrated into the TNC supplier networks with no local linkages in CE. As one car industry analyst has put it: 'In most cases, the only thing they [Škoda's foreign-owned suppliers in the Czech Republic] manufacture locally is the label. They're screwdriver plants where low-wage employees put together high-tech products manufactured back home in the West' (Harris, 1999: 14) . So while foreign suppliers transfer their new process technologies to their plants in the host nations (Fujita and Hill, 1995) , the regional economic effects of such plants are often very limited. In the system of lean production of automobiles, suppliers are increasingly expected to design their own components, assemble parts into component subsystems at the lowest possible cost and in perfect quality, and deliver them to automobile assemblers just in time. The surviving local suppliers not taken over by TNCs can rarely meet such conditions and, as a result, are unable to compete with efficient production of sophisticated parts dominated by TNCs. Consequently, if they survive, they typically specialize in high-volume production of simple components or become second-tier suppliers delivering simple parts to the foreign-owned firsttier suppliers. Such domestic suppliers are typically highly vulnerable to market fluctuations, their linkages with foreign-owned first-tier suppliers or car assemblers are weak and do not involve much exchange of information and knowledge (UNCTAD, 2001) . As a result, even the few auto investments that are generally considered to be very successful and highly integrated in local economies (such as VW-Škoda) can lead to deskilling in the host countries. Additionally, the closure of uncompetitive domestic suppliers and extremely low or non-existent local content of foreign-owned suppliers may reduce the number of manufacturing jobs in the host countries (Fujita and Hill, 1995) .
The degree of local integration is also important for the stability of investments. Foreign-owned branch plants set up to assemble large quantities of goods for Western European markets from imported components that have no or very weak linkages with local firms are not necessarily very stable elements of local and regional economies because they could easily be shut down and their production relocated if wages were to go up, local currency to appreciate or the investor face economic difficulties at home (Nicholls et al., 1998; Pavlínek, 1998) . There have already been examples of companies moving their production from CE to cheaper locations because of rising production costs after only a few years of operation. Mannesmann (the German-based producer of seamless and welded steel tubes and pipes), Shinwa (the Japanese maker of electronic equipment) and Solectron (the American electronics manufacturer) have closed their production units in Hungary and moved them to China (Mannesmann and Shinwa) and Romania (Solectron). In the case of Mannesmann, 1,100 jobs were lost in the town of Sarbogard in western Hungary and an additional 500 people were laid-off in the city of Miskolc after Mannesman's supplier Shinwa followed Mannesmann to China (J.P. Serenyi, 2001b) . The Singapore-based Flextronics International, a contract electronics manufacturer, has recently moved its production from Hungary and the Czech Republic to China, citing lower labour costs in China as the reason. 12 In the case of Hungary, Flextronics produced Xbox computer game consoles for Microsoft. Its assembly operations in the city of Sárvár and component production in Zalaegerszeg were moved to the Chinese city of Doumen, resulting in the loss of 1,200 jobs. In the Czech Republic, Flextronics, which started to produce electronic equipment in the city of Brno in November 2000 and employed more than 2,500 workers in 2001, closed its factory in 2002. Flextronics received governmental incentives in the form of job-training subsidies, 10-year tax holidays, customs duty exemptions and free land in return for the promise of creating 3,000 jobs by 2005 and keeping those jobs for five years (Fránek, 2002; UNCTAD, 2002) . Other examples of TNCs moving their recently established production from the Czech Republic include the German Varta Aku which announced in November 2002 that it would move its production of cell phone batteries from Česká Lípa to an unspecified location in Asia to save on labour costs. The company will lay off 344 workers in the Czech Republic (MF Dnes, 2002) . Massive Production, the Belgian maker of lights, is moving its production to China from the Czech city of Litovel, and the Japanese-German Takta Petri is moving its steering wheel cover production from the town of Kalná to an unspecified location (Klímová, 2002) .
While the development of supplier linkages between foreign-owned and domestic companies is generally considered to be difficult (UNCTAD, 2001) , there are two specific problems that help explain weak linkages of many FIEs with local economies in CE. First, FDI in CE is a recent phenomenon and it takes time for foreign companies to develop supply linkages to domestic companies. Second, the generally lower level of technological and managerial knowledge in CE compared to the developed economies means that many CE companies are unable to satisfy the demands of foreign companies. For example, in the case of automobile manufacturing, foreign-owned car assemblers and first-tier suppliers often argue that domestic suppliers cannot meet their quality demands (see Pavlínek, 2002c) .
FDI-associated risks for host economies: the evidence from the Czech automotive components industry
To illustrate potential risks associated with FDI for CE countries, the second part of this paper draws on a case-study of the Czech automotive components industry conducted as part of a larger project on the processes of car-industry restructuring in CEE (see Pavlínek, 2002b; 2002c) . The following discussion focuses on three FDI-related issues: the stability of investment, its local and regional economic effects, and FDI effects on domestic R&D. The primary information presented is based upon in-depth interviews conducted by the author with directors or top managers of 20 automobile-industry component suppliers in the Czech Republic in 2000 and 2001, and it also draws on interviews conducted at the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade and at Škoda Auto in 1996 and at Škoda Auto, Tatra, Daewoo-Avia and Karosa vehicle manufacturers in 1999. The goal of the interviews was to collect information about the processes of enterprise transformation in the 1990s and the effects of different ownership structures on enterprise restructuring strategies. The component suppliers interviewed were selected from the three groups of companies based on their different ownership structures (domestic, joint venture, foreign). Nine of these suppliers were fully or partially foreign-owned at the time of the interview. However, the top managers of Czech-owned suppliers also provided important insights and assessments of FIEs because four of them formed joint ventures (JVs) with foreign partners that involved parts of their companies. 13 Most of the remaining companies interviewed have seriously considered forming JVs with foreign partners in the past or at the time of the interview and underwent negotiations with potential foreign investors (see Pavlínek, 2002a: 362) . 14 While this type of qualitative research is not and does not claim to be a fully representative sample of the Czech automotive industry as a whole, interviews with key informants represented by top managers of selected companies provide important insights into the actual processes of FDI-related enterprise transformation. As such, this research complements empirical/quantitative studies of enterprise restructuring and FDI effects at the enterprise level.
Stability of Western investment
Many Western car-component suppliers have been attracted to the Czech Republic not only by the geographical proximity of Škoda Auto assembly operations, but also by the possibilities of low-cost production for West European vehicle manufacturers and lately by generous governmental incentives for foreign investors. 15 The average 2000 wage in the Czech automotive industry as a whole stood at Kč16,050 (AIA, 2001) which was DM881.5 or $415.9. In 2000, the average German labour cost was DM7,835.49 per employee per month in the automotive industry (VDA, 2001) . The average Czech automotive-industry wages were thus 11.25 percent of average automotive industry labour cost in Germany in 2000.
Average wages in the Czech automotivecomponent sector vary significantly but overall they reflect average wages for a particular sector and a particular type of work in a particular region and they are very low compared to those of Western Europe (Table 6 ). The differences among the component suppliers interviewed in 2000 and 2001 were significant. Barum Continental's average monthly manual wage of Kč21,000 (the highest in the Czech Republic) was more than three times higher than the average wage in the HLF Hajnice plant (Kč6,500). benefits of lower labour costs. Seventy percent of components production is exported and the value of exports reached $3.6b in 2000 (CzechInvest, 2001a) . The geographical proximity of the Czech Republic to Germany allows some Czech component suppliers to supply German car assemblers in the just-in-time (JIT) system. For example, Hayes Lemmerz's subsidiary located in Mladá Boleslav is JIT and in-sequence supplying assembled wheels and tyres to the VW assembly plant in Dresden, Germany. 16 In those cases where the major concern of the foreign investor is to protect or improve its competitive position in the markets outside the Czech Republic through more cost-effective vertical integration, the cost of production has been the decisive location factor. In such a situation, the production can move to cheaper locations abroad when wages and overall production cost increase as the above mentioned examples from the Czech Republic and Hungary document. Indeed, attachments of some component suppliers to specific locations seem to be rather tenuous. For instance, the new Hayes Lemmerz assembly plant launched in Mladá Boleslav in August 1999 to supply wheels to Škoda was built according to the specifications of Hayes Lemmerz but the company does not own it. It only owns the machinery and interior equipment. The director argued that there were two reasons for this situation. First, the building as such is not part of the core business of the company so it does not need to own it. Second and more important, in his words 'we could be replaced anytime as we replaced the previous suppliers. It is possible to take away the machinery but impossible to move the building'. 17 This case suggests that some component suppliers are employing various strategies to minimize their sunk costs (Clark, 1994) in order to increase their overall flexibility.
Local and regional economic effects
Empirical research focusing on FDI spillover effects to the domestic economy in the Czech Republic and CE as a whole has so far found them to be weak and statistically insignificant. For example, Jarolím (2000) found FDI spillover effects to be statistically insignificant in the Czech Republic, rejecting his hypothesis that foreign presence was positively affecting the productivity growth of domestically owned firms. Similarly, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) found a statistically insignificant spillover effect of FIEs on domestic industrial firms between 1992 and 1996. This means that even if FDI positively affected the performance of FIEs, these positive effects did not spill over to the domestic industry. The authors explain the lack of spillover effects by a short study-period, and suggest that know-how spillovers require a certain minimal level of technological capacity and effort on the part of domestic firms to be absorbed. Kinoshita (2001) also found spillovers from FIEs to be insignificant for Czech manufacturing firms. The empirical research in other CEE countries yielded similar results. Konings (2000) , for example, found no evidence of positive spillover effects of FDI to domestic firms in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. He found negative spillover effects in Bulgaria and Romania, while there were no spillovers to domestic firms in Poland. Similarly, the empirical studies from less developed countries such as Morocco (Haddad and Harrison, 1993) and Venezuela (Aitken and Harrison, 1999) found either statistically insignificant or negative spillover effects from foreign to domestic companies in terms of impact of FDI on productivity growth of domestic companies. To say the least, the empirical research does not support the overly optimistic views of FDI effects on domestic industry.
FIEs may have a detrimental effect on local companies by attracting their skilled and semiskilled workers. In the Czech Republic, domestic companies and regional politicians have increasingly been voicing their concerns about the negative effects of FIEs on local companies, complaining that foreign investors build new factories and entice workers away from local companies by offering higher wages and better work conditions (Dolejší, 2001) . For example, the mayor of the south Bohemian city of Písek argued that not even a new factory with 1,000 new jobs is necessarily beneficial for a region if it headhunts the most skilled workers away from local companies using governmental financial incentives for foreign investors (Kerles, 2001) . In southern Bohemia, where the unemployment rate stood at 5 percent in 2001, local and foreign companies have been competing over skilled workers such as locksmiths, turners, toolmakers and welders, with FIEs being much more successful. Local companies complain that they are unable to increase their production to satisfy the existing demand for their products because of the acute shortage of skilled workers caused by increasing competition from newly established FIEs (Dolejší, 2001) . Local companies are forced to increase wages rapidly to keep up with FIEs, which may force them out of business. The governmental support for the development of small and medium-size local enterprises is extremely small or non-existent compared with the incentives offered to foreign investors to create new jobs (Kerles, 2001) . FIEs can afford to pay higher wages not only because they are much stronger economically than local companies, but also because they receive up to $5,000 from the Czech government for each newly created job, which represents the average annual wage in the Czech automotive sector. The situation at the local level thus calls for a more critical assessment of FDI effects on local economies in CE and more realistic expectations as to its contribution to regional economic development.
FDI effects on domestic research and development
Large TNCs started to locate sizeable R&D operations abroad and established significant global R&D networks only in the mid-1970s (Howard, 1990a: 277) . The globalization of R&D advanced considerably in the 1990s (Dalton and Serapio, 1999) . The degree of centralization and decentralization of R&D within the corporate hierarchy is typically related to the type of research conducted. While basic research as a strategic function tends to be localized close to the company headquarters, applied research tends to be decentralized to the individual product divisions. The highest degree of decentralization is typically related to development work which is conducted at the plant-level. Such corporate R&D hierarchy in large corporations is in turn expressed in a spatial hierarchy of R&D in which basic research, and to a lesser extent applied research, tends to be spatially concentrated in core metropolitan regions.
Development activity is more geographically dispersed, even though it also tends to favour more central regions. For TNCs, this typically means that the most important R&D centres are located in home countries where the leading-edge R&D on TNCs' core technologies is conducted, while R&D operations abroad involve smaller-scale applied research and development activities (Howard, 1990b: 135-8; Dalton and Serapio, 1999: 7-9) . Consequently, the vast majority of R&D expenditures by TNCs are realized in home countries and the location of R&D facilities abroad has been almost exclusively the core phenomenon. 18 FDI generally, and export-oriented FDI particularly, tends to vertically integrate domestic producers into large TNCs in which basic R&D is typically concentrated in the TNC's home country in the developed world (Howard, 1990b; Grabher, 1994; Gowan, 1995; Pavlínek, 1998; Pavlínek and Smith, 1998) . 19 Two groups of reasons for R&D investments abroad by TNCs can be identified: demand-driven and supply-oriented (Howard, 1990a: 277; 1990c: 496-7; Dalton and Serapio, 1999: 38) . The demand reasons include the TNCs' needs to customize and develop their products for foreign markets and to support their manufacturing, sales, or service activities in host countries in order to gain and maintain market power. The supply-oriented reasons involve the need to tap pools of foreign R&D labour and expertise and to develop new products that could be sold globally based on the ideas and innovations generated in foreign subsidiaries. Two general scenarios of FDI effects on R&D in host regions are recognized in the literature. The first possibility is the transfer of R&D by TNCs from host country's FIEs to their home countries. The second scenario leads to an upgrading of host country's R&D through the location of home-base-augmenting laboratories in host regions to exploit specialized local expertise (Dunning, 1992; Hotz-Hart, 2000) .
In the context of CE generally and the Czech Republic specifically, it has been argued that FDI can undermine the abilities of recipient countries to develop their own domestic industrial innovation and R&D sector, and therefore diminish their ability to produce more value-added goods and services (e.g. Jindra, 1996) . 20 Young et al., 1994) . At the same time, many foreign TNCs may transfer the existing R&D to their R&D centres located abroad after their takeover of domestic companies. Empirical analysis of the determinants of the R&D expenditures of 241 Czech and 186 Hungarian firms in chemical and mechanical engineering industries concluded that foreign ownership 'adversely affects the chances of investment in R&D' (Urem, 1999: 179) .
In the case of Hungary, for example, R&D expenditures declined from 2.3 percent of GDP in 1988 to 0.6 percent in 1997 (Kapoor and Eddy, 1998) . Similar declines in R&D spending were recorded in Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, which spent only 0.7 percent, 1.0 percent and 1.2 percent of their GDP on R&D respectively in 1995. Declines in absolute terms were even larger because of sharp drops in GDP in the early 1990s (Knell and Hanzl, 1999; Radosevic and Auriol, 1999) . Between 1989 and 1995, R&D expenditures declined by 80 percent in Slovakia, 67 percent in Hungary, 64 percent in the Czech Republic and 35 percent in Poland (Gokhberg, 1999) . It is not clear, however, to what extent R&D expenditures have declined due to collapsed governmental demand, economic difficulties of domestic firms, or changed methodology to assess R&D. 21 It is also unclear whether TNCs' transfer of R&D abroad, if any, played a role in this decline in the 1990s.
According to the survey conducted by CzechInvest in 1998, 22 percent of foreign investors in manufacturing conduct 'significant' R&D in their Czech subsidiaries and 53 percent conduct product development work on exported goods. The OECD reported that 33 percent of Czech corporate R&D expenditures were made in the automotive sector and 63 percent of overall R&D expenditures were financed by industry compared to 43 percent in Hungary and 31 percent in Poland (CzechInvest, 2001b) . According to the Czech Automotive Association, 65 percent of companies in the Czech automotive industry conduct R&D, and on average the companies spend 4 percent of their annual turnover on R&D. 22 Interviews with 20 Czech component suppliers and Škoda Auto conducted in 2000 and 2001 revealed three major R&D location strategies pursued by foreign investors in the Czech automotive sector in the 1990s (Table 7 ). All three strategies are seeking cost-effective R&D and two of them are related to the different spatial structures of TNCs and the position of Czech subsidiaries in the corporate hierarchy (Massey, 1995) . including selected experienced and talented Czech engineers and designers, tends to be transferred from Czech suppliers to the specialized R&D centres, typically located in the TNC's home country. TNCs preferring such a concentration of R&D are typically those specialized in the production of a limited number of automotive components or modules and servicing car assemblers in various markets worldwide (so called 'global sourcing'). This is a cost-efficient approach that assures a highquality R&D and avoids overlapping R&D in different subsidiaries of the same TNC. The elite group of first-tier multinational automotive component suppliers that emerged in the past 10-15 years built specialized R&D centres where they have concentrated R&D for their worldwide operations. These R&D centres are typically concentrated in the core areas of automobile production of the United States, Western Europe and Japan (Bordenave and Lung, 1996) . In the Czech context, it usually means that there is no or very limited development of new products in foreign branch plants and the existing R&D (basic R&D in particular) has been transferred to specialized R&D centres after the acquisition of Czech suppliers. For instance, Barum Otrokovice used to develop its new products in-house and its basic R&D used to be done at the nearby research institute. After its acquisition by Continental, all product development including testing of products was transferred to Continental's central R&D facility. Several of Barum's researchers work in the centre. Barum has kept a construction office, and about 35-40 workers are engaged in tasks associated with applied product development. 23 Similarly, R&D was centralized after Federal Mogul merged with T&N and the existing R&D was largely transferred from its Kostelec nad Orlicí subsidiary to research centres in Germany, France and the United Kingdom. In 2000, 18 workers were engaged in the product development, some of them working on projects not related to on-site production. 24 Draka Kabely, a greenfield factory built to produce industrial cables and cable harnesses, has no R&D. R&D is conducted at Draka's factories in the Netherlands and Germany. 25 Avon Rubber has an R&D centre in Westbury (Wiltshire, UK) and, subsequently, its Czech subsidiary Avon Automotive a.s. Rudník has retained only limited R&D functions, such as cooperation with its suppliers' designers on the shape of supplied components, their pilot production, and durability tests. 26 It remains to be seen what the long-term effects of such R&D transfers abroad will be in terms of innovation and research capacities and the overall economic development of the Czech Republic (Jindra, 1996) . The transfer of strategic functions such as R&D, decision-making powers, global marketing and management functions to parent Western companies not only increases the dependency of local component suppliers on Western companies, but it also makes them more vulnerable at times of economic difficulty.
Local R&D promotion based on specialized expertise (multi-local strategy)
The second strategy is related to the conglomerate model of TNCs in which the production of different commodities is under the same financial control. In such a case, a TNC tends to leave the R&D functions in its specialized subsidiaries that concentrate on the production of one class of automotive components exported worldwide. The pressure to concentrate R&D from various companies producing different products to one site is lower than in the case of several branch plants producing the same component in different locations (markets). The individual subsidiaries that possess specialized expertise within a particular TNC and produce a unique product are likely to be responsible for product development. This approach then stresses the development of R&D functions along with the production function in subsidiaries. In such a scenario there are no attempts to transfer the existing R&D abroad, and some companies have experienced growth in R&D conducted in the Czech Republic after foreign acquisition.
In the case of Temac Zvěřínek, owned by the Royal Econosto N.V., the Dutch owner did not limit the existing R&D and there were no attempts to transfer it abroad. One reason is that the Econosto Group specializes in the production of industrial sealing products, while Temac also produces the automobile gaskets in which the Econosto Group has no expertise. However, the existing R&D was and is very small and its automotive section has only four workers. 27 In the case of PAL Praha, the company was already spending 7 percent of its turnover on R&D in the early 1990s, long before its JV agreement with the Canadian firm Magna. After
European Urban and Regional Studies 2004 11(1) PAVLÍNEK: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS OF FDI the JV was formed, PAL Praha built a new R&D centre which was planned before the JV formation and was finished in December 2000. The centre includes the development of new products, a prototype workshop, laboratories, testing rooms and a measurement centre. It employs 70 workers, which is more than its R&D employment before 1989. PAL Praha is fully responsible for R&D of its products. There is no transfer of R&D results from Magna to PAL because Magna has no expertise in the production of small electric engines (the core business of PAL). 28 Local R&D promotion based on skilled and inexpensive R&D labour (supply-oriented strategy) Finally, the third approach minimizes the cost of R&D for TNCs by developing R&D in the Czech Republic, capitalizing on its highly educated and experienced designers and engineers who are much cheaper than comparatively skilled and educated workers in the West. This approach depends on the existence of a highly skilled workforce fully compatible with its Western counterparts and is not necessarily related to the production function. This is the case for Lucas Autobrzdy, one of two Lucas European braking systems subsidiaries, where R&D is conducted despite the initial efforts to concentrate all R&D in the other R&D site in Germany. R&D is more important at Lucas Autobrzdy today than before its foreign acquisition despite the approximately same number of workers employed in R&D compared to the early 1990s. R&D at Lucas Autobrzdy was integrated into Lucas's worldwide R&D operations. About 90 percent of new products developed at Lucas Autobrzdy are not produced on-site but are developed for other Lucas factories. Recently, there have been efforts to further expand local R&D because 'a highly skilled and experienced engineer costs much less [in the Czech Republic] than abroad'. 29 Škoda Auto used to employ 600 workers in its R&D centre before the acquisition by VW. In 2000, the company employed 1,229 workers in R&D (Škoda Auto, 2001 ). Between 1998 and 1999, Škoda built a new designer centre in its R&D complex for Kč200m (about $5.5m) for 160 'top-class constructors and designers ' (Škoda Mobil, 1998: 1) . This particular R&D expansion will save Škoda $12m annually for external services (Němec, 1997) .
Although after the acquisition of Škoda by VW it was originally assumed that R&D would be transferred to Germany, the quality and experience of Škoda's engineers, combined with their low cost compared to German ones, have not only saved R&D at Škoda but led to its substantial expansion. 30 Still, higher engineering functions related to platform development have been transferred to Germany and Škoda's R&D has focused on the adjustment of VW Group's platforms to use Czechsourced components. At the same time, some routine R&D functions (such as CAD operations) have been moved from Germany to Mladá Boleslav to exploit the benefits of low-cost labour (CzechInvest, 1997) . 31 Similar developments could be seen across CE. The German-based Audi AG (part of the VW group) has recently built a new $13.7m R&D centre at its Hungarian subsidiary Audi Motor Hungária Kft in the city of Györ. The R&D centre was finished at the end of 2001 and employs 80 Hungarian engineers concentrating on the development of VW Group engines (T.S. . Knorr-Bremse, the German manufacturer of brake systems for trucks and buses, opened its R&D centre in Budapest in 1999 where more than 80 engineers conduct R&D on strategic electronic systems and pneumatic products (ITD, 2001) . R&D expenditures of FIEs as a percentage of R&D expenditures of all enterprises increased from 22.6 percent to 78.5 percent between 1994 and 1998 in Hungary and from 1.3 percent in 1997 to 6.4 percent in 1999 in the Czech Republic (UNCTAD, 2002) , suggesting increased importance of R&D conducted by FIEs in CE.
It remains to be seen whether the cases of Lucas Autobrzdy, Škoda Auto, PAL Praha, Audi Hungária and others signal a new trend of allocating more R&D responsibilities to CE by TNCs. It seems highly unlikely that any main automotive R&D centres will be transferred from the Western European automobile production core to its CEE periphery. In fact, the recent restructuring of the European automobile industry tended to reinforce strategic activities in the core, represented mainly by Germany, at the same time as some production activities were decentralized to the European periphery to take advantage of lower production costs. This led to increased domination of the European automobile production core over other European regions (Bordenave and Lung, 1996) . It seems more likely that only some car manufacturers and component suppliers that have large-scale production in CE will set up R&D subsidiaries in the region to take advantage of local skills and low wages to minimize the purchasing of external services from Western Europe, thus further minimizing the cost of production in CE. It is also likely that such R&D centres will concentrate on routine R&D activities while the core R&D functions will remain concentrated in Western Europe, the United States and Japan.
The situation in the Czech automotive industry thus suggests that FDI effects on domestic R&D depend on particular cost-cutting strategies pursued by different types of TNCs. In other words, in some cases TNCs prefer cost-effective concentration of R&D in the developed countries, while in other cases the development of particular R&D functions in the Czech Republic and CE as a whole could be a cheaper alternative to R&D concentration in highwage countries. It remains to be seen which of these contrasting approaches will become more important and what its effects will be on the Czech R&D sector.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to provide an overview of regional economic effects of FDI in CE. Although FDI inflows to CEE as a whole increased dramatically in the 1990s, they remained very low compared to Western Europe and within global FDI flows. While FDI has played an increasingly important role in the region, its effects have so far been very uneven both sectorally and geographically. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia received almost two-thirds of total FDI inflows to CEE. Compared to the rest of the region, these countries benefited from their favourable relative location with respect to Western Europe, higher levels of socio-economic development, higher speed of economic transformation, skilled and inexpensive labour, relative political stability, and the prospect of early EU membership. In addition to market capture investments, which dominated FDI inflows in the first half of the 1990s, these countries became a favourable location of cross-border export-oriented investments by Western TNCs in the second half of the 1990s. Within these four countries, FDI remains highly concentrated in capital cities and other metropolitan areas. Those industrial sectors targeted by Western investors, such as the passenger car industry, underwent profound transformations and were integrated into the periphery of Western European production systems.
However, the evidence so far from CE does not support overly optimistic views of FDI and its role during the post-communist economic transformations in the region. In the rush for FDI as a quick and efficient fix of CE economies, it has often been overlooked that FDI potentially has both positive and negative effects on regional economic development, depending on the type of economic activities and strategies pursued by particular TNCs in different local and regional conditions. Let us not forget that the investment by foreign TNCs is driven by their profit-seeking strategies that do not necessarily coincide with the long-term economic well-being of host regions and localities. The longterm economic effects of FDI in CE are uncertain at the moment, and it remains to be seen whether positive FDI effects will outweigh potentially negative impacts. This paper identified several potentially negative effects of FDI on local and regional economic development. The CE economies increasingly dependent on FDI, which is specifically looking for low-cost locations, are becoming more vulnerable to plant closures if local currencies appreciate rapidly or local wages increase substantially. Economic vulnerability is compounded by the fact that countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia have become economically quite dependent on the fortunes and misfortunes of a single TNC (Volkswagen) . 32 This type of economic vulnerability has recently materialized in Poland after South Korean Daewoo collapsed and Italian Fiat experienced serious economic difficulties at home resulting in plant closures, lay-offs and rapidly declining passenger car production. Weak local and regional economic linkages of many foreign-owned enterprises not only mean that their overall regional economic impact and spillovers are limited, but they also make it relatively easy to move such production to lowercost locations, should the need arise. As such, foreign-owned enterprises are not necessarily very stable elements of local and regional economies. The short case-study of FDI effects on domestic R&D in the Czech passenger car industry has revealed that the fears of potential large-scale transfers of industrial R&D abroad by TNCs may be exaggerated. Foreign TNCs pursue three distinct R&D strategies in the Czech passenger car industry related to the globalization of R&D. The transfer of industrial R&D abroad is likely in what I called the 'global R&D strategy'; this is linked to the partprocess spatial model of TNC and global sourcing strategies in which foreign subsidiaries produce a limited number of standardized automotive components in different markets. The conglomerate model of TNC is related to the multi-local industrial R&D strategy; in this, local R&D, based upon specialized expertise within a TNC, is maintained and further developed to serve the TNC's needs in a particular class of products. The third industrial R&D strategy is linked neither to a particular spatial structure of TNCs nor to a particular type of production but is rather supplyoriented. In this strategy, foreign-owned R&D facilities are attracted to the Czech Republic for cost-cutting reasons to tap into skilled and inexpensive R&D personnel. These facilities typically concentrate on routine applied and development types of research while basic research remains concentrated in the core areas of global passenger car production.
There is no doubt that the importance of FDI and TNCs in the economies of CE will increase in the future. A sober assessment of FDI's contribution to economic development in the less developed regions such as CE, and realistic expectations about its overall economic and regional effects combined with well-defined governmental policies towards FDI, can become an important component of forward-looking and successful economic development policies in CE. Dunning (1993b) and Young et al. (1994) for different types of FDI. 3 Estimates of average annual investment 'needs' in CEE in the 1990s ranged between $103b and $260b (EBRD, 1993: 83) . Colins and Rodrik (1991, cited in EBRD, 1993) estimated that CEE (excluding the FSU) would require $421b annually for 10 years to achieve the average Western levels of labour productivity and $344b to reach annual growth rates of 7%. 4 Prague together with the top nine FDI-recipient districts (out of 76 districts) received 71% of all FDI, while the bottom 43 districts received only 10% by the end of 1999. 5 Košice benefited from the purchase of its steelworks by US Steel in 2000. The purchase price was $500m and US Steel promised to invest an additional $700m over a 10-year period (The Economist, 2001a) . 6 According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Budapest and Pest county accounted for 64% of FDI stock in 1998 (OECD, 2000) . This high figure exaggerates the position of Budapest because it is based upon the location of company headquarters rather than actual production units. Many foreign companies maintain their headquarters in Budapest while actually producing elsewhere in Hungary (Hamar, 1999; Fazekas, 2000; OECD, 2000) . The figures of FDI stock and employment concentrated in Budapest reported by Fazekas (2000) are based upon the National Labour Centre's Wage Tariff Survey that provides a more accurate measurement of FDI distribution in Hungary. Based on these data, Budapest accounted for 48.8% of industrial FDI stock and 40.5% of FIE employment in 1998. 7 The corresponding numbers are 78.1% of FDI stock and 72.1% of FIE employment in 1998 using the National Labour Centre's Wage Tariff Survey (calculated from Fazekas, 2000) . 8 In 1998, the eastern half of Hungary still accounted for only 15% of annual FDI inflows. By 2001, its share increased to 30-40%. However, the East has attracted FDI looking for a less skilled and lower-paid labour force compared to the North West (Serenyi, 2001a) . 9 In the Czech Republic, the 10 largest investments accounted for 28% of FDI stock in 2000 (CNB, 2001 ). 10 However, the tight vertical integration is not costeffective in cases of resource-oriented investments where the production depends on local resources, such as agricultural products for the food industry, construction materials and natural resources for a number of industries such as furniture, paper, wood and glass (see Pavlínek and Smith, 1998; Domański, 1999 Republic. The largest R&D expenditures by foreignowned businesses in the US come from Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan, followed by France, Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden (Dalton and Serapio, 1999: 9, 17, 35, 39, 83) . 19 One survey of 621 FIEs conducted in the Czech Republic found that 21% of surveyed firms conducted 'significant R&D inside their Czech companies' and 56% of firms did some R&D or product development in the Czech Republic (Pomery, 1997 (CzechInvest, 2001a; 2001c; 2001d) . 32 VW Slovakia-dominated car industry of Slovakia accounted for 19% of Slovakia's GDP in 1999. VW Slovakia accounts for 16% of total Slovak exports. In the case of the Czech Republic, 14% of Czech exports are attributable to VW-Škoda and its suppliers and some 4% of the Czech workforce are employed directly or indirectly by VW-Škoda (Klimentová, 2000; The Economist, 2001b: 60) .
